Pieter du Toit, The Super Cadres: ANC Misrule in the Age of Deployment (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 2024)
STATE capture nearly bankrupted South Africa. Its mechanics and perpetrators were well documented by investigative journalists and then by the admirable Raymond Zondo’s commission. But less attention has been paid to the way it came about, and why. This is the task Pieter du Toit sets himself. In the process he reveals little new detail, but he develops a damning narrative of the role of the ANC subdivided into sections headed foundation, consolidation, expansion and destruction.
His title is a play on The Super Afrikaners, written by Ivor Wilkins and Hans Strydom and published in 1978, that lifted the lid on the Broederbond. The authors were also journalists and the book was likewise published by Jonathan Ball. Du Toit’s conclusion is that hubris is the reason for corruption, maladministration and the downfall of the ANC caught up in fossilised ideology personified by Gwede Mantashe. There are distinct parallels between Broederbond and ANC; all the more tragic when remembering the moral authority wielded by the latter in 1994.
State dominance was, however, a common objective of both and by the turn of the century fusion of party and State was open ANC policy. There had been an interlude during the presidency of Nelson Mandela, the Pretoria Spring of 1994‒1996, when liberal democracy supported by individuals with high moral standards, principles and ability appeared to be ascendant. Then came cadre deployment, patronage and a rent-seeking predatory culture due to what Du Toit characterises as a closed circle of cronies. Going back to the years of exile, however, criminal behaviour was rife and the most notorious crook, Joe Modise, was subsequently a key figure in the transparently corrupt arms deal.
The ANC was unprepared for high office and needed a dependable civil service, akin to the British model and loyal to the State. But the ANC chose loyalty to party on Soviet lines. Many essential staff were encouraged to leave, opening up a skills chasm. There was no reason why most of them could not have contributed to the reconceptualisation of the South African nation, the consolidation of fragmented apartheid structures, and the establishment of a new governing culture.
It was soon apparent that the freedom dividend would not materialise after adoption of the GEAR policy and its growth imperative at the expense of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The arms deal was initiated under Mandela, but there had been intimations of trouble: the Sarafina corruption scandal, suppression of the Shell House massacre inquiry, the Boesak affair and protection of the corrupted Stella Sigcau (and expulsion of Bantu Holomisa for nailing her). Mandela’s reconciliatory inclinations did not preclude putting party interests above those of good governance. The ANC overtraded its struggle credentials and this has continued.
Du Toit argues that it is futile to look for nuances, for example differences between inziles and exiles. Rent-seeking was common practice from the outset; the contrived arms deal the practice run. It normalised the parallel world of lies, illegality and evasion of procedure that enabled corruption. A closing of ranks created an ethics-free zone and any challenge to it was met ruthlessly with intimidation, doctoring and suppression of evidence, and ultimately by accusations of racism. Both individuals and the party benefited with the ANC notorious for financial impropriety particularly around election time. The post-1999 brain drain from parliament helped and the list system provided strict discipline. The consequence was incompetent forward planning, neglect of Eskom being a prime example.
The Leninist system deploying ANC cadres was characterised by a paranoid vanguardism that saw enemies everywhere. Thabo Mbeki was the principal architect of post-liberation South Africa, an intransigent president searching for central control with the sinister Essop Pahad as his enforcer. This was for ideological reasons, but set the scene for intensified malfeasance. It was masked by a good economic record, the president’s bizarre stance on AIDS and his Zimbabwe blind spot; and his ability to antagonise sufficient numbers to create a coalition of the wounded.
By the time of the Polokwane putsch in 2007, the State was already acting as a ‘party employment agency’. Now Jacob Zuma’s thugs were in plain sight, although the groundwork had been laid by Mbeki. Using the rhetoric of revolution, the rule of law and its practitioners were attacked; the Scorpions were abolished; the media was besieged; and key state institutions such as SARS and the NPA were eviscerated. A predatory elite and their Gupta allies then descended on state-owned enterprises to loot them. A remarkable range of politicians rallied around Zuma and Du Toit mentions Yunus Carrim in particular for his role in the abolition of the Scorpions and damage to SARS. In many ways, Zuma was years ahead of Donald Trump. Cadre deployment was no longer simply ideological, but venal.
Du Toit is particularly harsh on Cyril Ramaphosa who served as Zuma’s deputy but did nothing meaningful to prevent state capture. As state president he then prioritised party unity. While Zuma was in power, ANC eyes were averted and consciences disengaged. He behaved not as president of a modern state, but corrupt chief; while Ramaphosa acted as praise singer.
The super cadres and their hangers-on were finally stopped in their tracks at the eleventh hour while trying to capture the Treasury, their most effective opponents the media and the judiciary. But many of the culprits still wield political power and few have gone to prison. Ramaphosa’s vaunted long game has been largely ineffective and he is now regarded as a weak president. Cadres and traditionalists in tandem are now preparing an assault on the constitution with reprobates such as Zizi Kodwa claiming that state capture was a figment of the imagination.
Du Toit justifiably highlights the replacement of intellectual rigour by corruption and ineptitude within the ANC, although many would argue that this happened long ago. And while the backwash of state capture is all too visible, a new and even more dangerous version is consolidating around organised crime.