Collette Schulz-Herzenberg and Roger Southall (eds), Election 2024 South Africa: Countdown to Coalition (Johannesburg: Jacana, 2024)

IT was widely assumed from the start of the 2024 general and provincial election campaigns that the ANC would lose its national and some provincial majorities. The question was by how much; and what sorts of coalition might be formed. Opinion polling did indeed prove correct.

Two global trends evident in these elections were absenteeism and abstention from electoral politics; and the rise of populism. An entirely local dimension following a Constitutional Court ruling was the accommodation of independent candidates, a challenge for a list system based on proportional representation. Major worries concerned South Africa’s poor experience of coalition government at provincial and municipal level; and the threat of extremism from anti-constitutionalists.

The previous (sixth) administration led by Cyril Ramaphosa had seen a worsening of the triple crises of State, government and economy. At the heart of all three was mismanagement and looting of state-owned enterprises and the resultant looming debt crisis; together with a consistent tendency to miss out on development targets. This can be summed up as the failing culture of an ANC reluctant to disengage from its fossilised roots. It had long since lost the moral legitimacy of a liberation movement.

Cyril Ramaphosa failed to curb factionalism or stop the rot of corruption in the ANC. For example, the horrific findings and subsequent recommendations of the Zondo commission into state capture had been almost entirely ignored. South Africa is now a failing state increasingly run by mafias that blend criminality and politics; compounded by cash-in-transit heists and zama zama operations for instance. Rather than a developmental, South Africa is a developing gangster state. One commentator, Richard Poplak, speculated that the 2024 election was the rehearsal for political dystopia in which the foundations of constitutionalism would be dismantled.

Independent candidates turned out to be a monumental red herring, perhaps a deliberate diversion from serious electoral reform. Direct accountability could work only in a constituency-based system. In South Africa, independent candidates are already accommodated by the low participation threshold for small parties. However, in 2024 the apparent rising culture of small party support failed to materialise. Twelve independent candidates attracted a mere 34 000 votes; none won a seat. Only two made any sort of impact: Zackie Achmat, a national civil society figure, who took 0.54% of the Western Cape vote; and the comedian Thanasagren Moodley who came closer to a seat in KwaZulu-Natal with a smaller percentage and playing on ethnic identity.

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) presided, dealing with an increased volume of litigation and backed up by the Electoral Court. Many of the cases predictably involved Jacob Zuma’s MK Party (MKP), which has a policy of disruption. In true populist fashion, it claimed that the result had been rigged; without a shred of evidence. The rule of law and the Constitution prevailed, the IEC stuck doggedly to its familiar timetable and lived up to its independent name; and the election was unanimously (except by MKP and a few fringe parties) declared uncompromised, free and fair.

These were the seventh national elections of the democratic era, the most important for many years and hotly contested. Yet turnout was only 59% compared with a global average of 70%. Initial press excitement about long queues had little to do with sheer numbers. The 16.2 million voters were down from 17.5 million (66%) in 2019; only 70% of eligible citizens registered; so only 40% of them actually ended up voting. Disengagement was greatest in urban areas; and another noticeable feature was that younger voters chose not to exercise their considerable potential influence. Cynicism and alienation are a serious danger to democracy; and good KwaZulu-Natal figures, probably indicating the power of ethnic identity, were also a mixed blessing.

This was the first time other parties had out-polled the ANC since 1994 and the scale of loss, down 17%, reflected the seriousness of the triple crises. The ANC’s supposed clean-up of candidate lists proved shallow and its integrity committee toothless. Its election campaign lacked vigour and sources of funding were opaque. It appeared to be scraping an empty barrel, although finances miraculously improved in time. Nevertheless, it failed to achieve majorities in the country as a whole and in the three most important provinces.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) improved its performance and appeared to have stabilised after a period of internal upheaval. It remained the most diverse party, but with largely urban support. Its stated aim was to prevent EFF participation in government and to this end promoted a multi-party coalition committed to constitutionalism. In the event none of the DA’s partners performed particularly well, but electoral arithmetic nevertheless produced a centrist coalition with a surplus majority termed a government of national unity (GNU) for legitimation.

The MK Party was yet another ANC breakaway, but the first to make such an initial impact with an unprecedented 15% of the poll. Jacob Zuma put himself forward as a loyal rebel carrying the genuine legacy of the ANC, although he was ineligible as a convicted criminal for a seat in parliament. Its manifesto was a clear assault on constitutional democracy with a potentially authoritarian agenda that attracted many recruits.

Whether MKP is radical or reactionary is still a matter of debate, although it is unquestionably populist. In KwaZulu-Natal it stole numerous ANC branches and borrowed ethnic tactics from Inkatha. It also tapped into socially conservative, religious sentiment with attacks on gays and punitive plans for unmarried pregnant women. In the background were shadowy mafias exercising criminal patronage. Immediately after the election MKP claimed in Trumpian fashion that it had been stolen and that nine million votes had gone missing. No evidence whatsoever was presented.

The other main populist party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) whose ideological alignment is a matter of contention, renounced its well-rehearsed disruptive political theatre, but stagnated. Its student base failed to deliver votes, its decision to target KwaZulu-Natal was a colossal failure, and its support proved fluid. In spite of the announcement of a people’s coalition (PC) this soon disintegrated.

Electoral rules encourage maximum representation via minimal thresholds (0.25%). Eighteen small parties won between one and 20 seats on the back of 14% of the popular vote. The few that flourished had prominent leaders (in the case of the Inkatha Freedom Party, a dead one) and a political footprint in local government. It was anticipated that the black middle class, particularly in Gauteng, might vote for a small clutch of new parties, two of them offshoots of the DA. But they garnered only 2% of the vote.

The impact of coalitions was already well known at local government level and many, although not all, had been chaotic, with the emphasis on positions and patronage potential rather than performance. Some councils experienced endless no-confidence motions and such instability and opportunism suggested a need for tight regulation.

The GNU consists of ten parties holding 72% of the seats; but two of them, ANC and DA, occupy 62% of them. Without the DA, the ANC would struggle to stay in power unless it enrolled the EFFs. Many in the ANC tolerate the GNU because they see it as a road to recovery. As with all junior coalition partners, the DA has taken a big risk. And the fate of the 2025 budget speech gives a taste of the challenges.

Coalitions were also necessary in three provinces, most notably Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal (Northern Cape was resolved very simply). That in KZN was created expressly to keep MKP out of power and thus contain the potential influence of taxi, construction and transport mafias, although this encouraged threats of violence. In Gauteng the ANC made it impossible for the DA to participate and opted for a minority government.

A verdict of this book is that South Africa reached a point of political maturity in 2024. The ANC was gracious in defeat and there was no suggestion that it would ignore its constitutional duty, although the results ensured continued dominance. Nevertheless, reactionary populist parties took nearly 30% of the vote, more than half due to the resilience of Zuma and the end of Ramaphoria. Thus, a rogues’ gallery of opportunists, crooks and nonentities became the official opposition in parliament led by a disgraced and impeached judge.

Does this have further significance? Is a realignment in prospect with constitutionalists lining up against populists in a way that will reshape the political landscape? And with provinces increasingly holding the key, there are slight stirrings of secession in two of them, KZN and the Western Cape, that may be a portent of the future even though none of the parties involved won seats. ANC provincial bodies have become laws unto themselves with the grip of Luthuli House loosening.

This is the fourth in a series of South African electoral studies supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. It contains a wealth of statistics that make it a useful reference source; but its narrative is equally interesting and very readable. Inevitably there is a degree of repetition across different contributions given the complexity of these elections.